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INTRODUCTION
Globalization, digitalization, and the Internet have been the main
challenges for intellectual property (“IP”) since the turn of the
century. Globalization has reduced the cost of transportation and
communication across the world; the digitalization of content has
facilitated and increased the flow of copyrightable works;1 and, the
Internet, which is the paradigm for global services, has allowed the
cross-border transfer of digital works in seconds.2 As a result of these
phenomena, creating and maintaining an adequate protection for IP
rights has required several modifications to both domestic and
international laws, especially in regard to copyright.3
Until recently, at the international level, instruments on IP had
focused their efforts on harmonizing domestic laws through the
adoption of common standards on the scope, duration, and
limitations of IP rights.4 Therefore, to some extent, these instruments
had ignored two issues: (1) the enforcement of those rules and (2)
their adequacy for the digital environment. These issues, as well as
the counterfeiting and piracy of goods that affect commercial
interests, are the main topics addressed by the Anti-Counterfeiting
Trade Agreement (“ACTA”).

1. See generally NICHOLAS NEGROPONTE, BEING DIGITAL 58-61 (1995)
(arguing that copyright law is inadequate to protect digital works because
digitalization has become so precise, quick, and pervasive that it cannot be
analogized to the copying of analog works).
2. See MARGARET JANE RADIN ET AL., INTERNET COMMERCE: THE EMERGING
LEGAL FRAMEWORK 460 (Foundation Press, 2d ed. 2006) (noting that copyright
owners initially hesitated to place their creations on the Internet because perfect
copies could be disseminated quickly and easily).
3. See id. at 460-61 (commenting that technological innovations have led
judges and legislators to update outdated language in court rulings and statutes).
4. Cf. Margot Kaminski, The Origins and Potential Impact of the AntiCounterfeiting Trade Agreement (ACTA), 34 YALE J. INT’L L. 247, 248 (2009)
(noting that the World Intellectual Property Organization―based on the Paris and
Berne Conventions―“served as a venue for treaty negotiation and soft law rather
than a source of uniform standards or enforcement measures”).
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This article analyzes ACTA provisions that attempt to balance the
protection of IP rights with the fundamental rights of users, in
particular those related to the right to privacy and the right to
protection of personal data.5 As described in detail below, this work
concludes that the ACTA negotiating parties ultimately failed to
strike a balance that adequately protects such rights.

I. ACTA’S PURPOSE AND PRIVACY PROVISIONS
According to statements from governments taking part in the
ACTA negotiations, the initiative aims to establish international
standards for the enforcement of IP rights that target more efficiently
the increasing problem of counterfeiting and piracy.6 This effort is
said to be focused on “commercially-oriented counterfeiting and
piracy” rather than the activities of common people.7 However, an
analysis of ACTA’s privacy provisions reveals a different concern;
the provisions seem to focus more on enforcing the law against
citizens rather than against large-scale criminal organizations.8 The
preamble of the finalized text of ACTA takes note of “the
proliferation of . . . services that distribute infringing material” in

5. See discussion infra Part II (arguing that the standards established by
ACTA will unjustifiably encroach upon citizens’ civil rights).
6. E.g., ACTA Fact Sheet (March 2010), OFF. U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE,
http://www.ustr.gov/acta-fact-sheet-march-2010 (last visited Mar. 1, 2011).
7. See id. (“The ACTA does not focus on private, non-commercial activities
of individuals, nor will it result in the monitoring of individuals or intrude in their
private sphere.”); see also Press Release, European Comm’n Directorate Gen. for
Trade, Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement: European Commission Welcomes
Release of Negotiation Documents (April 21, 2010), http://trade.ec.europa.eu/
doclib/press/index.cfm?id=552 (stating that ACTA’s purpose is to “address largescale infringements of intellectual property rights” and “by no means [will] lead to
a limitation of civil liberties or to ‘harassment’ of consumers.”).
8. See, e.g., infra notes 112-116 and accompanying text; see also Kaminski,
supra note 4, at 250 (implying that it is dangerous to conflate the terms
“counterfeiting” and “copyright infringement,” as this tends to lump dangerous
counterfeiting, such as that linked to terrorism or the drug trade, in with less
egregious individual instances of copyright infringement). But see Charles R.
McManis, The Proposed Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (ACTA): Two Tales
of a Treaty, 46 HOUS. L. REV. 1235 (2009) (describing “two tales” of the reasons
for ACTA―(1) the need to fight organized crime and terrorist organizations, as
representatives involved have claimed the agreement was meant to do, and (2)
criminalizing file-sharing, as the drafts prior to the December 3, 2010 finalized
version have indicated ACTA will attempt to do).
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addition to counterfeiting and piracy, and expresses the desire to
address that infringement.9 This wording, which appears only in the
Oct. 2, 2010 draft and the Dec. 3, 2010 final version,10 painfully
reveals the actual intent of the negotiating parties―to deal with the
daily activities of common people.
Although the negotiations of ACTA did not take place in any
multilateral forum11 such as under the auspices of the World Trade
Organization (“WTO”) or the World Intellectual Property
Organization (“WIPO”), the negotiations involved a cadre of states
including Australia, Canada, Japan, Mexico, Morocco, New Zealand,
Singapore, South Korea, Switzerland, the United States, and the
European Union (“E.U.”).12 From 2008 to September 2010, there
were eleven rounds of negotiations, all conducted secretly. Only after
enormous pressure from civil society organizations and the European
Parliament13 was there an official public release of a provisional text
9. Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement pmbl., Dec. 3, 2010 [hereinafter
ACTA Text―Dec. 3, 2010], available at http://www.dfat.gov.au/trade/acta/FinalACTA-text-following-legal-verification.pdf.
10. The recognition that the ACTA intended to deal with any infringement, and
not only with piracy, started to appear in the October 2, 2010 draft. Compare AntiCounterfeiting Trade Agreement: Informal Predecisonal/Deliberative Draft pmbl.,
Aug. 25, 2010 [hereinafter ACTA Draft―Aug. 25, 2010], available at
https://sites.google.com/site/iipenforcement/acta (follow “Full Leaked Text Dated
August 25, 2010”) (discussing only the proliferation of counterfeit trademark and
pirated copyright goods), with Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement: Informal
Predecisonal/Deliberative Draft pmbl., Oct. 2, 2010 [hereinafter ACTA
Draft―Oct. 2, 2010], available at http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2010/
october/tradoc_146699
.pdf (including distributing services), and ACTA Text―Dec. 3, 2010, supra note
9, pmbl. (retaining the language regarding distributing services from the October 2,
2010 draft).
11. Eddan Katz & Gwen Hinze, The Impact of the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade
Agreement on the Knowledge Economy: The Accountability of the Office of the
U.S. Trade Representative for the Creation of IP Enforcement Norms Through
Executive Trade Agreements, 35 YALE J. INT’L L. ONLINE 24, 26 (2009),
http://www.yjil.org/online/volume-35-fall-2009/the-impact-of-acta-on-theknowldge-economy (suggesting that the parties chose to negotiate outside of
multilateral institutions because the institutions lack enforcement power).
12. Press Release, Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, U.S., Participants
Finalize Anti–Counterfeiting Trade Agreement Text (November 15, 2010),
http://www.ustr.gov/about-us/press-office/press-releases/2010/november/usparticipants-finalize-anti-counterfeiting-trad.
13. See, e.g., Resolution of 10 March 2010 on the Transparency and State of
Play of the ACTA Negotiations, EUR. PARL. DOC. P7_TA-PROV(2010)0058
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of the agreement―on April 21, 2010.14 Unfortunately, this release
was not much of a concession in favor of transparency concerns; the
public had to wait until October 2, 2010 for the next official release,
and until Dec. 3, 2010 for the release of the final draft text.15
However, versions of the draft of the agreement were leaked: one
before the first public release in January 201016 and others after the
ninth and the tenth rounds in July17 and August 2010,18 respectively.
Therefore, an inquiry into the negotiation and the developing
interpretation of ACTA reveals that there is no public record of the
successive rounds, save two official drafts, three leaked versions, and
the final draft text. These documents expose an incomplete mosaic of
the progress during the negotiations. This is especially the case for
the leaked versions of the agreement, as they, unlike the official
releases, include the positions of negotiators from specific countries
and uncensored footnotes. This article is based on the final text of
ACTA from December 3, 2010; consequently, all below references
to the ACTA text are to the December 3, 2010 version, except as
otherwise noted.19
(2010), available at http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=//EP//TEXT+TA+P7-TA-2010-0058+0+DOC+XML+V0//EN&language=EN
(reprimanding the European Commission for failing to inform or consult with
Parliament about the negotiations, and threatening to bring a case before the
European Court of Justice if the Commission continued to negotiate without
transparency).
14. Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement: Public Predecisonal/Deliberative
Draft, Apr. 21, 2010 [hereinafter ACTA Draft―Apr. 21, 2010], available at
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2010/april/tradoc_146029.pdf.
15. ACTA Draft―Oct. 2, 2010, supra note 10; ACTA Text―Dec. 3, 2010,
supra note 9; see Press Release, Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, supra
note 12 (emphasizing that despite the release of the final ACTA draft, the finalized
version would still be subject to domestic processes).
16. Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement: Informal Predecisonal/Deliberative
Draft, Jan 18, 2010 [hereinafter ACTA Draft―Jan. 18, 2010], available at
https://sites.google.com/site/iipenforcement/acta (follow “Full Leaked Text Dated
January 18, 2010”).
17. Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement: Informal Predecisonal/Deliberative
Draft, July 1, 2010 [hereinafter ACTA Draft―July 1, 2010], available at
https://sites.google.com/site/iipenforcement/acta (follow “Consolidated ACTA
Text, July 1, 2010”).
18. ACTA Draft―Aug. 25, 2010, supra note 10.
19. In spite of the triumphalism that surrounded negotiators—who in October
2010 assured ACTA was done and required only that the parties sign it—the
agreement still remained incomplete, to some extent. It required not only editing
(e.g., there were still six articles numbered 2.X in that text), but also substantive
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The structure of ACTA includes a preamble and six chapters
covering initial provisions and definitions, proposed legal framework
for the enforcement of IP rights, enforcement practices and
mechanisms, norms of international cooperation, an institutional
arrangement, and final provisions related to the effects of the
agreement.20 For purposes of this article, it is necessary to explain in
some detail those norms related to the legal framework for enforcing
the law, which include some general obligations, provisions on civil
enforcement, border measures, criminal enforcement, and special
measures related to the enforcement of IP rights in the digital
environment.
The section on general obligations ensures the adoption of
procedures by the parties and provides some general safeguards with
several purposes, such as to avoid the abuse of procedures, to prevent
public officers’ liability, and others.21
In relation to civil enforcement, ACTA requires parties to have
available civil procedures to enforce rights, including procedures for
injunctions, damages, other remedies, access to information related
to infringements and the people involved, and provisional
measures.22
The section related to border measures requires parties to adopt
certain measures for goods suspected of infringing IP rights, except
in the case of de minimis infringement.23 These measures can be
adopted by application of rights holders or ex officio by custom
authorities of member states,24 for imported and exported goods, as
decisions related to the nature of some obligations of the parties (e.g., art. 2.14.3),
safeguard measures (e.g., arts. 2.X: scope of the border measures, and 2.X: border
measures), and more importantly the very scope of some provisions of the
agreement (e.g., art. 2.18 and the still-in-bracket footnote 2). In fact, the same
ACTA draft recognized that delegations had even expressed some reservations.
See ACTA Draft—Oct. 2, 2010, supra note 10. Those pendent issues were solved
only in the final text, ACTA Text―Dec. 3, 2010, supra note 9, which is analyzed
in this article.
20. ACTA Text―Dec. 3, 2010, supra note 9.
21. See id. art. 6.
22. Id. arts. 7-12.
23. See id. art. 14, ¶ 2 (allowing parties to exempt from punishment travelers
who possess a small number of non-commercial goods within their personal
luggage).
24. Id. art. 16, ¶ 1; see T. Jesse Goff, Note, Regulation of Digital Copyrights
and Trademarks at the U.S. Border: How the Proposed Anti-Counterfeiting Trade
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well as those in transit or under customs control.25 Parties shall also
provide safeguard measures—procedures to determine infringement,
remedies, and reasonable enforcement fees, and to some extent, the
disclosure of information about infringements and the people
involved.26
Although ACTA failed to conceptualize criminal offenses, it
adopted a minimal common standard for criminal enforcement and
allowed countries to heighten this standard.27 This approach could be
troublesome for those countries that limit criminal enforcement to
for-profit infringements. Also, ACTA disproportionately extends
liability to aiding and abetting,28 and allows legal persons to be
criminally liable without prejudice to the criminal liability of the
natural persons involved in the offences.29 In addition, ACTA adopts
criteria for penalties and sanctions, and includes provisions about
seizure, confiscation/forfeiture, and destruction of suspected
counterfeit or pirated goods.30 Finally, ACTA requires parties to
allow ex officio criminal enforcement in established cases.31
The section on enforcement of IP rights in the digital environment
is by far the most innovative,32 as several of the issues raised by
Agreement and the Enacted U.S. Pro-IP Act will Destabilize the Current System,
16 SW. J. INT’L L. 207, 218-19 (2010) (contending that these provisions give
customs officials an unnecessary amount of power to act on their own without any
oversight).
25. ACTA Text—Dec. 3, 2010, supra note 9, art. 16, ¶ 2.
26. Id. arts. 18-22.
27. Id. art. 23, ¶ 1-3.
28. ACTA Text—Dec. 3, 2010, supra note 9, art. 23, ¶ 4; cf. AntiKNOWLEDGE,
Counterfeiting
Trade
Agreement,
PUB.
http://www.publicknowledge.org/anti-counterfeiting-trade-agreement (last visited
Mar. 1, 2011) (proclaiming that the damages established by the agreement, which
include imprisonment and monetary fines, are disproportionate to the crimes
charged and do not include safeguards for innocent infringement).
29. ACTA Text—Dec 3, 2010, supra note 9, art. 23, ¶ 5.
30. Id. arts. 24 & 25.
31. Id. art. 26; see Goff, supra note 24, at 220 (pointing out that the civil
liberties group IP Justice has harshly criticized ex officio criminal enforcement
because it violates an alleged infringer’s due process right to challenge an official’s
accusation of infringement and decision to seize and destroy the alleged infringer’s
property).
32. See McManis, supra note 8, at 1253 (remarking that the provisions
regarding Internet regulation were highly controversial because they proposed
monitoring citizens and internet service providers, which detracts from ACTA’s
original focus on commercial activity).
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those provisions have never been regulated in previous international
instruments, not even in the WIPO Internet Treaties.33 This section
seems to be drafted as an updated version of the Digital Millennium
Copyright Act (“DMCA”),34 but, by the July 1, 2010 draft, there was
evident disagreement among the parties. In fact, almost all the
articles were still in brackets (meaning they were not agreed upon),
several included alternate proposals, and the section contained more
footnotes than any other.35 Scholars and civil society organizations
seriously criticized the intended provisions for disrespecting human
rights standards, damaging IP balances, and undermining the
capacity of countries to adopt and implement policies of public
interest.36 Unable to harmonize different legal regimes, negotiators
made key concessions during the last two draft rounds by (1)
refraining from settling on provisions about the limitation of liability
for online service providers, and (2) lowering their expectations for
protection of effective technological measures and rights
management information.37
33. Kaminski, supra note 4, at 247-48. The World Intellectual Property
Organization adopted both the Performances and Phonograms Treaty and the
Copyright Treaty, collectively known as the WIPO Internet Treaties, which
provide protection for works in the digital environment and regulate technological
protective measures. See World Intellectual Property Organization Performances
and Phonograms Treaty, art. 18, Dec. 20, 1996, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 105-17
(1997); World Intellectual Property Organization Copyright Treaty, Dec. 20, 1996,
S. TREATY DOC. NO. 105-17 (1997).
34. Adopted in 1998, the DMCA amended the U.S. Copyright Act, Title 17 of
the U.S. Code, to comply with the WIPO Internet Treaties. However, beyond the
purpose of the mentioned treaties, it also included provisions limiting the liability
of online service providers for copyright infringement. See Digital Millennium
Copyright Act, Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860 (1998) (codified in scattered
sections of 17 U.S.C. and 28 U.S.C.).
35. See ACTA Draft—July 1, 2010, supra note 17, art. 2.18 & n.44 (containing
conflicting suggestions and revisions from eleven separate parties with some,
including Canada and Mexico, reserving the right to make more adjustments at a
later date).
36. See, e.g., Text of Urgent ACTA Communique: International Experts Find
that Pending Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement Threatens Public Interests,
AM. U. WASH. C. L. PROGRAM ON INFO. JUST. & INTELL. PROP. (June 23, 2010),
http://www.wcl.american.edu/pijip/go/acta-communique [hereinafter Urgent ACTA
Communique] (concluding that the April 2010 ACTA draft contained provisions
that are hostile to the public interest because they limited basic human rights for
the protection of personal data and freedom of expression, among others).
37. Compare ACTA Draft—July 1, 2010, supra note 17, art. 2.18 (suggesting
language that would generally exempt service providers from liability where the
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In the finalized text of ACTA, the section on the enforcement of
IP rights in the digital environment, the scope of which is
ambiguous,38 begins by establishing an unwieldy complementary
application of the provisions related to civil and criminal
enforcement.39 The section then requires promoting cooperation
within the business community to address IP infringement,40
encourages the disclosure of personal information of Internet users
by online service providers,41 and mandates protection of effective
technological measures and electronic rights management
information.42
Unlike previous international agreements on IP, ACTA includes
explicit references to privacy and data protection. Neither the Berne
Convention nor the Paris Convention, which are the main
international instruments on copyright and patents, makes any
reference to privacy or data protection.43 The Agreement on Tradeinfringement results from automated technology, is uploaded by a user and not the
service provider, or a user posts a link to a site with infringing material), with
ACTA Text—Dec. 3, 2010, supra note 9, art. 27 (dropping these specific
provisions).
38. Even by the last round of negotiations, some delegations had expressed
reservations around several provisions of this section, which remained pendent.
Compare ACTA Draft—Oct. 2, 2010, supra note 10, art. 2.18 (suggesting a broad
scope that included all intellectual property rights in the title of the section and its
article 2.18.1; the existence of competing proposals for articles 2.18.2 to 2.18.4,
one limiting the effects to copyright and related rights, while another extending its
scope at least to trademark and copyright and related rights), with ACTA Text—
Dec. 3, 2010, supra note 9, art. 27 (preserving a broad scope for the provisions in
the name of the section title and art. 27 ¶¶ 1 and 2; narrowing the scope to
trademark, copyright and related rights, in art. 27 ¶¶ 3 and 4; and, limiting its
effects to copyright and related rights, in art. 27 ¶¶ 5-8)
39. See ACTA Text—Dec. 3, 2010, supra note 9, art. 27, ¶ 1 (applying to the
digital environment the enforcement procedures set forth in Sections 2 and 4 of the
agreement without regard to the unique circumstances of that environment).
40. Id. art. 27, ¶ 3.
41. Id. art. 27, ¶ 4.
42. Id. art. 27, ¶¶ 5-7. The agreement requires the prohibition of manufacturing,
importing, or distributing devices or services that are primarily designed to
circumvent rights protections or has limited commercial significance outside of
such a function. Id. ¶ 6. The agreement also allows certain “appropriate”
exceptions to “measures implementing the provisions” dealing with effective
technological measures. Id. ¶ 8.
43. See Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works,
Sept. 9, 1886, as amended on Sept. 28, 1979, 25 U.S.T. 1341, 1161 U.N.T.S. 30;
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Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (“TRIPS
Agreement”) refers to such protection only indirectly; it provides that
members of the World Trade Organization (“WTO”) may allow their
judicial authorities to order alleged infringers to disclose the identity
of third persons involved in infringements, but only when such
disclosure would not be disproportionate to the seriousness of the
infringement.44 In addition, the TRIPS Agreement includes some
provisions that deal with secrecy and confidentiality, but they focus
on commercial, business, and manufacturing information, not on
personal information.45
ACTA expressly calls attention to privacy and data protection in
several of its provisions by ensuring that nothing in ACTA detracts
from domestic legislation regarding the protection of the right to
privacy.46 In particular, it does not preempt domestic laws that
regulate access to or disclosure of personal data in civil enforcement
and border measures;47 it encourages parties to order online service
providers (“OSPs”)48 to transfer expeditiously information on the
Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, Mar. 20, 1883 (as last
revised at Stockholm, July 14, 1967), 21 U.S.T. 1583, 828 U.N.T.S. 305.
44. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, art.
47, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade
Organization, Annex 1C, 1869 U.N.T.S. 299 [hereinafter TRIPS Agreement].
45. See, e.g., id. art. 34, ¶ 3 (ensuring that parties take into account the need to
protect manufacturing and business secrets when establishing the burden of proof
for process patents); id. art. 39, ¶ 3 (prohibiting parties from disclosing chemical
patent information unless necessary to protect the public or where parties ensure
the information is not utilized for unfair commercial purposes); id. art. 40
(protecting the confidentiality of information when nations work in conjunction to
control anti-competitive practices); id. arts. 42-43 (mandating the creation of
evidentiary procedures to identify and protect confidential information in the
enforcement of intellectual property rights); id. art. 57 (exempting measures for the
“protection of confidential information” from customs searches); id. art. 63, ¶ 4
(safeguarding confidential information from transparency requirements).
46. See, e.g., ACTA Text—Dec. 3, 2010, supra note 9, art. 4 (limiting the
disclosures of confidential information to the level allowed under each party’s
privacy laws).
47. Id. art. 22.
48. Unlike the more popular phrase “Internet service provider” (“ISP”), “online
service provider” suggests that the provisions apply not only to those that offer
services through the Internet, but any public or private, open or closed digital
network. Because of that difference in the intended scope and because of its actual
use in all ACTA drafts, this paper adopts it, despite American readers likely being
less familiar with it than the ISP phrase.
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identity of subscribers to right holders in claims of infringement;49
and it preserves privacy in the implementation of enforcement
procedures, cooperation within the business community, and the
identification of Internet users.50 In addition to these express
mentions, ACTA suggests a connection with the right of privacy in
several other provisions, such as those referring to the rights of
participants in procedures, preservation of evidence, collection,
analysis and cross-border transfer of relevant data, and information
sharing through international cooperation.51 Therefore, ACTA both
expressly and implicitly references the right to privacy.
The Executive Director of the Electronic Privacy Information
Center, Marc Rotenberg, correctly states that IP rights never have
conferred per se the right to identify users.52 However, because
enforcing IP rights requires identifying supposed infringers,
particularly in the digital environment, the ACTA negotiating parties
have been forced to include the aforementioned provisions about
privacy and personal data protection. The provisions seemingly
intend to balance competing interests—reaching an appropriate level
of enforcement for IP and, at the same time, guaranteeing an
adequate level of protection for privacy and personal data. Such a
balance is elusive, particularly because the underlying interests
conflict.53 In spite of their social value as promoters of the progress

49. Id. art. 27, ¶ 4.
50. Id. art. 27, ¶¶ 2-4 (adding that these obligations shall be implemented in a
“consistent [manner] with that Party’s law, [and] preserve[] fundamental principles
such as freedom of expression, fair process, and privacy”).
51. See, e.g., id. art. 12, ¶ 4 (requiring a party to provide assistance to a
defendant to prevent the abuse of a defendant’s rights); id. art. 14, ¶ 2 (permitting
the exclusion of personal non-commercial infringing goods from a party’s rules);
id. art. 28, ¶ 4 (promoting the collection and analysis of data); id. art 34 (mandating
information sharing between parties).
52. See The WIPO Copyright Treaties Implementation Act and Privacy Issues:
Hearing on H.R. 2281 Before the Subcomm. on Telecomms., Trade, and
Consumer Prot. of the House Comm. on Commerce, 105 Cong. (1998) [hereinafter
WIPO Copyright Treaty Hearing] (testimony and statement of Marc Rotenberg,
Dir., Electronic Privacy Info. Ctr.) (observing that the protection of copyright
ownership did not threaten privacy protections historically).
53. See id. (acknowledging that it may be necessary to identify the user of a
work to establish infringement, but arguing that information should not be
collected on individuals’ personal Internet activities and private preferences or
people may be forced to avoid the Internet to protect their privacy).
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of science and useful arts,54 IP rights are essentially “private
rights.”55 Obtaining adequate protection for the rights to privacy and
personal data is important not just for individual interests, but also
for the protection of higher societal values. The rights to privacy and
personal data are essential to the very idea of democracy and as
safeguards of human rights.56
In the following pages, this article briefly analyzes the main
challenges that ACTA creates for privacy and data protection,
nascent provisions for an international treaty about IP. Unfortunately,
the numerous references to privacy and personal data protection in
the treaty does not mean that ACTA strikes an adequate balance
between the interests at play. In fact, this article concludes the
opposite—that ACTA has seriously undermined the right to privacy
and the protection of personal data.

II. CRITICISMS OF ACTA’S PRIVACY PROVISIONS
Analyzing the effects of ACTA on privacy and data protection
poses some challenges. Luckily, with the completed agreement, they
are less daunting now as compared to months ago when the draft was
replete with brackets, proposals, and footnotes, which indicated
dissimilar positions and prevented identifying the real intent of the
negotiating parties, let alone which provisions would ultimately
prevail. However, the main challenge in analyzing ACTA persists;
that is, the lack of official reports on the meetings and the secrecy of
the negotiations have obstructed any effort to discern the actual
public policy rationale for the decisions taken by negotiating parties,
especially given the remaining ambiguities and remarkable
omissions.57
54. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8 (“The Congress shall have power To . . .
promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to
Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and
Discoveries.”).
55. TRIPS Agreement pmbl. (“recognizing that intellectual property rights are
private rights”).
56. Cf. Frances S. Grodzinsky & Herman T. Tavani, P2P Networks and the
Verizon v. RIAA case: Implications for Personal Privacy and Intellectual
Property, 7 ETHICS & INFO. TECH. 243 (2005) (arguing that privacy protections are
necessary for the preservation of individual autonomy and to enable free
expression).
57. See, e.g., Katz & Hinze, supra note 11, at 30-31 (revealing that the U.S.
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Probably because the E.U. has the strongest legal framework for
the protection of rights to privacy and personal data,58 its authorities
criticized ACTA for failing to provide adequate protection to those
rights; this criticism lead the negotiators to introduce most of the
clauses that are intended to safeguard the aforementioned rights and
to reject some of the proposed clauses that jeopardized them.59
Analyzing, or even describing, the legal framework to protect
privacy and personal data adopted by the E.U. is beyond the scope of
this paper. But, briefly, their framework provides a comprehensive
legal regime for processing personal data related to physical persons,
by automatic or manual process, for the public and private sectors.60
At the Community level, this framework includes specific provisions
in the Charter of Human Rights61 and several directives, such as the
Data Protection Directive,62 the Directive on Privacy and Electronic
Communications,63 and the Data Retention Directive.64 As a general
principle, the processing of personal data requires the express
consent of the data subject, except in specific circumstances provided
by domestic law, and the independent national authorities’ guarantee
of the enforcement of the law.65
In February 2010, one month after the first leaked version of
Trade Representative vehemently protected the information and requested that the
negotiation participants sign a confidentiality agreement and that little information
be released to the public, possibly to avoid the backlash such analysis could
create).
58. See Fred H. Cate, The EU Data Protection Directive, Information Privacy,
and the Public Interest, 80 IOWA L. REV. 431, 437-39 (1995) (noting that European
Union countries have provided such significant data protection that they have
pressured the United States and Canada to improve theirs, which, at the time this
article was written, was virtually nonexistent).
59. This point is particularly evident when contrasting the outcome drafts from
the ninth and the tenth rounds of negotiation, that is, between June and August
2010. Compare ACTA Draft—July 1, 2010, supra note 17, with ACTA Draft—
Aug. 25, 2010, supra note 10.
60. Council Directive 95/46, art. 3.1, 1995 O.J. (L 281) 31 (EC).
61. Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, art. 8, 2000 O.J. (C
364) 1.
62. Council Directive 95/46, supra note 60.
63. Council Directive 2002/58, 2002 O.J. (L 201) 37 (EC).
64. Council Directive 2006/24, art. 1.1, 5, 2006 O.J. (L 105) 54 (EC).
65. See Cate, supra note 58, at 433 (elaborating that the processing of personal
data may occur in three situations: (1) with consent; (2) when data is legally
required to be processed; and (3) to protect the public interests of a private party
holding certain fundamental rights).
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ACTA, the European Data Protection Supervisor (“Supervisor”)
issued an opinion expressing his concerns about potential
incompatibility between envisaged ACTA measures and the
requirements of the E.U.’s data protection law.66 The Supervisor
drew special attention to the provision dealing with the three strikes
policy, which encourages the disconnection of users from the
Internet for supposed IP infringements, and the transfer of personal
data to third-party countries (i.e., states outside the E.U.) for
purposes of IP enforcement.67 Later, in July 2010, the Data
Protection Working Party (“WP29”), which is integrated with the
national authorities on the matter, sent a public letter to the European
Commission. In its letter, the WP29 called attention to several of the
proposed ACTA measures that interfered with the right to privacy,
expressing unease over future negotiations.68 This article returns to
the concerns of the E.U. authorities throughout the below analysis.
The following pages describe the provisions of ACTA related to
privacy and personal data, show how they connect with IP
enforcement, and analyze how they challenge the legal regimes in
countries that have already afforded some protection to privacy and
personal data.

A. ACTA MAKES A SERIOUS AND UNPRECEDENTED CONCESSION
OF PRIVACY AND DATA PROTECTION IN FAVOR OF INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY ENFORCEMENT
As aforementioned, ACTA makes several direct and indirect
references to privacy and data protection in an attempt to strike a
66. Opinions of the European Data Protection Supervisor on the Current
Negotiations by the European Union of an Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement
(ACTA), 2010 O.J. (C 147) ¶¶ 3, 8 [hereinafter Data Protection Supervisor
Opinions] (observing that intellectual property rights enforcement may threaten
individuals’ “fundamental right” to privacy and the protection of personal
information).
67. Id. ¶¶ 3-13.
68. See Letter from the Article 29 Data Protection Working Party to Karel de
Gucht, Comm’r, Eur. Comm’n, regarding the Data Protection and Privacy
Implications of the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement [ACTA] (July 15, 2010)
[hereinafter Letter from WP29], available at http://ec.europa.eu/justice/policies/
privacy/docs/wpdocs/others/2010_07_15_letter_wp_commissioner_de_gucht_acta
_en.pdf. (identifying the three strikes scheme, notice and take down procedure, and
searches by customs authorities as measures that would interfere with privacy
rights).
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balance with IP enforcement. The very mention of these interests
could be understood as an achievement for privacy advocates
because ACTA is the first international IP agreement to explicitly
recognize the importance of privacy and data protection. However, in
comparing ACTA with the TRIPS Agreement, those references seem
to be a mere concession in favor of IP enforcement.
In effect, the TRIPS Agreement recognizes not only the relevant
international IP agreements and conventions, but also the
applicability of the basic principles of the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade (“GATT”) of 1994 and the General Agreement on
Trade in Services (“GATS”), which are the multilateral treaties that
set forth rules governing international trade in goods and services
enforced by the WTO.69 The latter includes general exceptions that
authorize measures inconsistent with GATS when those measures are
necessary to secure compliance with laws or regulations related to
the protection of individual privacy.70 These general exceptions allow
countries to develop public policies on several issues without
practical limitations in fields such as safety, protection of the
environment, public morals, public order, and personal data
protection.71 ACTA, on the contrary, requires countries to adopt
given measures against the privacy and personal data protection of
Internet users in order to enforce IP laws,72 such as encouraging their
identification by OSPs and requiring the cross-transfer of personal

69. See Intellectual Property: Protection and Enforcement, WORLD TRADE
ORG., http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/agrm7_e.htm (last
visited Mar. 1, 2011) (noting that in addition to the basic principles contained in
GATT and GATS, the TRIPS Agreement includes the principle of contribution to
technical innovation and transfer of technology).
70. See General Agreement on Trades in Services, art. XIV, Apr. 15, 1994,
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1B,
1869 U.N.T.S. 183 [hereinafter GATS] (applying these exceptions in relation to
the processing and dissemination of personal data and the protection of
confidentiality of individual records and accounts).
71. See PETER P. SWIRE & ROBERT E. LITAN, NONE OF YOUR BUSINESS:
WORLD DATA FLOWS, ELECTRONIC COMMERCE, AND THE EUROPEAN PRIVACY
DIRECTIVE 191 (1998) (explaining limitations to the exception, none of which refer
to intellectual property enforcement). In fact, countries using this exception abide
by several tests set forth by Article XIV of the GATS, and thereby prevent abuse
of the exceptions. See Council for Trade in Services, Work Program on Electronic
Commerce, Progress Report to the General Council, S/L/74, ¶ 14 (July 27, 1999).
72. E.g., Urgent ACTA Communique, supra note 36.
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data between states parties.73 Neither the inclusion of safeguards in
ACTA nor the express recognition of the freedom of parties to
determine the appropriate method of implementation changes the fact
that countries must adopt measures that undermine the rights to
privacy and the protection of personal data.
In sum, ACTA has made a serious and unprecedented concession
of privacy and data protection in favor of IP enforcement by
depriving countries of the freedom to adopt laws protecting the rights
to privacy and personal data protection, and by requiring the
implementation of measures that will negatively affect those rights.74
To be clear, ACTA does not prevent the adoption of public policies
on privacy and data protection by countries, but certainly imposes
some conditions on them.

B. ACTA OMITS APPROPRIATE SAFEGUARDS FOR THE RIGHT TO
PRIVACY IN GENERAL
Given the broad concession that ACTA has made with rights to
privacy and the protection of personal data in favor of IP
enforcement, it was necessary for the negotiating parties to include
appropriate limitations and safeguards for such rights because other
international instruments covering IP lack such protections. Even
though international instruments on human rights already protect the
right to privacy and the right to personal data protection, their effects
are limited, and none clearly apply to the possible abusive
enforcement of IP laws. Indeed, some have limited personal effect,
such as the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union,75
and most are not legally binding76 and, therefore, almost impossible
73. ACTA Text—Dec. 3, 2010, supra note 9, arts. 29 ¶ 1(b), 33 ¶ 3, 34.
74. See Goff, supra note 24, at 219-20 (indicating that ACTA privacy
protections are likely insufficient because the agreement encourages nations to
share information with one another, thereby mooting domestic regulations on
obtaining information).
75.See Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, arts. 7-8, 2000 O.J.
(C 364) 1 (providing that the right to privacy and the right to protection of personal
data shall be protected, but not addressing the competing interest of enforcing
intellectual property rights).
76. See, e.g., United Nations Guidelines Concerning Computerized Personal
Data Files, G.A. Res. 45/95, U.N. Doc. A/RES/45/95 (Dec. 14, 1990) (calling for
governments to consider including the guidelines for computerized personal data
files in their domestic laws); ASIA-PACIFIC ECON. COOPERATION, PRIVACY
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to enforce.77 Others could be legally binding but have an extremely
generic and ambiguous enunciation of those rights.78 In some
countries, like in the United States, human rights in general have
limited enforcement against the private sector, such as right holders
and service providers.79 Therefore, it was essential to include some
provisions that balance the right to privacy and IP enforcement.
During most of the negotiations, ACTA lacked any general
provision intended to deal with this balance. Only in the ninth round
of negotiations, which seems quite late given the importance of this
issue—particularly for the E.U., were different safeguards included
among the initial provisions.80 Most of them did not make it into the
final draft, but two provisions did survive and are particularly
relevant for purpose of this paper. According to ACTA:
“Nothing in this Agreement shall require any Party to disclose: (a)
information the disclosure of which would be contrary to its law or its
international agreements, including laws protecting privacy rights . . .; (b)
confidential information, the disclosure of which would impede law
enforcement or otherwise be contrary to the public interest . . . .”81

FRAMEWORK ¶ 12 (2005), available at http://www.ag.gov.au/www/agd/rwp
attach.nsf/VAP/%2803995EABC73F94816C2AF4AA2645824B%29~APEC+Priv
acy+Framework.pdf/$file/APEC+Privacy+Framework.pdf
(explaining
that
members should have flexibility to implement the principles that best suit their
economic and social backgrounds).
77. These instruments are only enforceable if they become customary norms.
However, they currently exist as non-binding rules and mere recommendations for
parties, lacking opinio juris, an essential element for customary law. See, e.g.,
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW §102 (1987) (defining
customary international law as a widely accepted principle that is generally and
consistently practiced by states out of a sense of legal obligation).
78. See, e.g., Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 (III) A,
art. 12, U.N. Doc. A/RES/217(III) (Dec. 10, 1948) (setting forth a general rule that
no one shall be subject to arbitrary interference with his privacy). This portion of
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights was codified in the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, art. 17, Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171.
79. However, remedies against private parties may be available. See, e.g., Alien
Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2006) (granting federal court jurisdiction for
civil cases where an alien has violated international law); Torture Victim
Protection Act of 1991, Pub. L. 102-256, 106 Stat. 73 (codifying the availability of
civil damages for a torture victim against a perpetrator acting under actual or
apparent authority of a foreign nation).
80. ACTA Draft—July 1, 2010, supra note 17, art. 1.4.
81. ACTA Text—Dec. 3, 2010, supra note 9, art. 4, ¶ 1 (containing an
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A thoughtless reading of these two clauses might give the
impression that they leave room for the parties to implement
domestic privacy laws that conflict with other obligations set forth in
ACTA; this is an effect similar to that of GATS, which safeguards
some public policies that, in theory, are inconsistent with its own
principles.82 However, a more attentive reading reveals that these
clauses have a narrow scope and objective. As will be analyzed later,
these clauses deal only with the disclosure of information between
parties; they do not deal with every process related to personal
information, and they refer only to the disclosure of such information
from one country to another.83 As a result of those limitations, the
mentioned clauses do not prevent abuse of IP enforcement and
jeopardize privacy and personal data protection. ACTA therefore
fails to provide an appropriate general safeguard for the rights to
privacy and data protection.

C. ACTA ENCOURAGES STATES PARTIES TO GRANT GREATER
ACCESS TO INTERNET USERS’ PERSONAL INFORMATION THAN
ALLOWED UNDER DOMESTIC LAWS IN FORCE
Enforcing the law in the digital environment to address individual
infringement requires the identification of infringers and,
consequently, collaboration between OSPs and rights holders. OSPs
have been collecting and processing Internet users’ personal data for
a long time, initially for pricing purposes,84 later by law in order to
assist with criminal prosecutions—particularly of cyber crime.85 By
additional third clause, which also sets forth an exception to the disclosure of
information that deals with confidential information of particular enterprises).
82. See supra note 70 and accompanying text.
83. See infra Part II.G.
84. For example, before offering Internet service access on a flat rate basis,
Internet service providers used a price structure based on the amount of time
connected, a calculation requiring them to process Internet users’ personal data.
See Andrew Odlyzko, Internet Pricing and the History of Communications 5, 7
(AT&T Labs Research Paper, Feb. 8, 2001), available at, http://www.dtc.umn.edu/
~odlyzko/doc/history.communications1b.pdf.
85. See Convention on Cybercrime, art. 20, Nov. 23, 2001, E.T.S. 185
(ordering parties to provide measures through which authorities can direct OSPs to
collect or record Internet usage data). But see Susan W. Brenner, The Council of
Europe’s Convention on Cybercrime, in CYBERCRIME: DIGITAL COPS IN A
NETWORKED ENVIRONMENT 207, 211-12 (Jack M. Balkin et al. eds., 2007)
(arguing that parties of the Convention have been unable to adopt even a common
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knowing the Internet protocol address86 and the date and time of
connection, OSPs are able to identify the connected computer. Once
the connected computer is identified, it is possible to connect it to an
Internet user and his/her physical address.87
Several provisions of ACTA require granting access to
information that facilitates the identification of supposed IP
infringers. Negotiators approved the inclusion of express privacy
safeguards related to statutory provisions that regulate the processing
of personal data;88 however, in the case of the digital environment, a
previous draft of ACTA emphasized that parties shall enable right
holders to “expeditiously” obtain from OSPs the information
necessary to identity the alleged infringer.89 The final text of ACTA
retains the “expeditious[]” language but does not oblige parties to
enable such access to indentifying information.90 In other words, the
understanding of criminal prosecution; in fact, the agreement is not self-executing,
does not provide a model legislation, allows reservation by parties, and fails to
provide an adequate understanding of the privacy rules on the matter).
86. An Internet protocol address is a number assigned to any device (i.e., a
computer) connected to the Internet. See Data Protection Supervisor Opinions,
supra note 66, ¶ 25. Sometimes the number varies according to the time of
connection and is assigned on demand by the OSP. This is called a dynamic
Internet protocol address. In other instances that number is permanently linked to a
given device, known as permanent Internet protocol addresses. Id. ¶ 25 n.17.
87. See id. This tracking system allows the identification of computers rather
than users. Id. ¶ 25. In fact, in some cases it is necessary to adopt additional
technical measures to identify a user, such as in the case of an open network (e.g.,
universities use a user name and password, while cybercafés use registers for
identifying users). Cf. id. (acknowledging that Internet protocol addresses and the
information acquired about them, including the user’s identity, constitutes personal
data).
88. See ACTA Text—Dec. 3, 2010, supra note 9, art. 27, ¶ 4 (providing a
general safeguard against violations of fundamental principles, including privacy,
but not expressly stating that violations of privacy rights shall not be allowed).
According to the first leaked version, those safeguards, which appear approved by
the second leaked version, were promoted by the European Union. See ACTA
Draft―Jan. 18, 2010, supra note 16, art. 2.4; ACTA Draft―July 1, 2010, supra
note 17, art. 1.4.
89. ACTA Draft—Apr. 21, 2010, supra note 14, art. 2.18.3 ter.
90. ACTA Text—Dec. 3, 2010, supra note 9, art. 27, ¶ 4 (“Each party may
provide . . . its competent authorities with the authority to order an online service
provide to disclose expeditiously . . . information sufficient to identify an alleged
infringer.”). The change from a mandatory to a facultative provision must have
happened between the April draft and August leak. Compare ACTA Draft—Apr.
21, 2010, supra note 14, art. 2.18.3 ter (“Each Party shall enable right holders . . .
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“shall” became a “may.” But still, rather than providing flexibility in
its implementation, that language reflects the failure of the
negotiating parties to reach a common understanding on the matter;
in fact, many countries involved in the negotiations already have
laws that allow the copyright holder to access such information from
OSPs.91 In any case, this discretionary language is dangerous,
especially considering the excesses of ACTA and its insufficient
safeguards and flexibilities,92 because other countries may be
politically compelled to adopt provisions already suggested by
ACTA.
Furthermore, the text of ACTA creates uncertainty by failing to
define “online service provider.”93 The obligation to identify
subscribers applies to any OSP and, at least until July 2010, ACTA
contained an extremely broad concept of an OSP.94 In fact, that
to expeditiously obtain from [the relevant OSP] information on the identity of the
[allegedly infringing] subscriber.”), with ACTA Draft—Aug. 25, 2010, supra note
10, art. 2.18.4 (using the same language as is found in the December final draft).
91. See, e.g., Domestic Laws in ACTA-Negotiating Countries, AM. U. WASH.
C. L. PROGRAM ON INFO. JUST. & INTELL. PROP., https://sites.google.com/
site/iipenforcement/domestic-laws-in-acta-negotiating-countries (last visited Mar.
1, 2011). There are such laws on the books of Australia, E.U. members, Korea,
New Zealand, and the United States, but, for example, Mexico does not have legal
provisions related to the liability of online service providers for copyright
infringement—neither notice-and-takedown procedures nor rules related to
identifying subscribers. Id.
92. See infra Parts II.D-G.
93. See USTR Releases Finalized ACTA Text: Concerns Remain, PUB.
KNOWLEDGE (Nov. 15, 2010, 9:41PM), http://www.publicknowledge.org/blog/
ustr-releases-finalized-acta-text-concerns-re (warning that the failure to define
“online service provider” could result in requiring websites that host content, such
as YouTube, to identify subscribers as well).
94. See, e.g., ACTA Draft—July 1, 2010, supra note 17, art. 2.18, ¶ 3 n.48
(conceptualizing an OSP as “a provider of online services or network access, or the
operators of facilities therefore, [including] an entity offering the transmission,
routing, or providing of connections for digital online communications, between or
among points specified by a user, of material of the users choosing, without
modification to the content of the material as sent or received”). It seemed
negotiating parties were in agreement on the definition of “online service
provider,” as, with the exception of a cosmetic Canadian proposal, no alternative
proposal appeared in the July draft, and there is no record of serious opposition by
any other country in any other draft. See id.; ACTA Draft—Jan. 18, 2010, supra
note 16, art. 2.17, ¶ 3 n.26 (including the concerns of New Zealand and Japan,
respectively, over whether “online service provider” includes a person who hosts
materials online, and whether the definition as a whole is “acceptable”); ACTA
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definition was broader than any other available in comparative law,
as it applied to any person—including physical persons, to any
provider—even those that only provide access, and, not only to
Internet-based providers, but to any online service.95 Fortunately, that
definition was expunged from the text of ACTA, but, unfortunately,
a new one was not substituted in its place. Therefore, ACTA offers
no guidance on the meaning of the phrase “online service provider,”
and whether it meets the domestic legal standards in force among
negotiating parties.
In the United States, DMCA procedures for taking down content
and identifying users are limited to an OSP that is an “entity”96—that
is, “an organization (such as a business or a governmental unit) that
has a legal identity apart from its members.”97 In other words, those
procedures apply only to legal persons, but not to physical persons or
human beings. According to older ACTA drafts, those provisions
would apply to any provider, which “includes an entity.”98 Therefore,
at least in the case of the United States and countries that have
adopted provisions similar to the DMCA in their Free Trade
Agreements (“FTAs”),99 the older ACTA drafts would have extended
the duties, obligations, and costs of IP enforcement not just to legal
persons, but possibly to common people. Today, because the latest
ACTA draft lacks a definition at all, the extent of those duties,
obligations, and cost is unclear.100

Draft—Apr. 21, 2010, supra note 14, art. 2.18, ¶ 3 n.50 (listing the proposed
definition in brackets, but not including the negotiating parties’ opinions of the
definition). The definition was dropped for the August, October, and most recent
December drafts. ACTA Draft—Aug. 25, 2010, supra note 10; ACTA Draft—Oct.
2, 2010, supra note 10; ACTA Text—Dec. 3, 2010, supra note 9.
95. ACTA Draft—July 1, 2010, supra note 17, art. 2.18, ¶ 3 n.48.
96. 17 U.S.C. § 512(k)(1) (2006).
97. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (9th ed. 2009).
98. E.g., ACTA Draft—July 1, 2010, supra note 17, art. 2.18, ¶ 3 n.48.
99. The United States has included similar provisions in FTAs with Singapore,
Chile, Morocco, Australia, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras,
Nicaragua and Dominican Republic, Bahrain, Oman, Peru, Colombia, and Panama.
See Free Trade Agreements, U.S. TRADE REP., http://www.ustr.gov/tradeagreements/free-trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements (last visited Mar. 1,
2011).
100. See Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement, supra note 28 (decrying the
vagueness of ACTA and arguing that the agreement heightens IP enforcement
without “even the barest measures to preserve” citizens’ rights).
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In the United States, according to the criterion in Recording
Industries Association of America v. Verizon Internet Services, Inc.,
DMCA procedures do not require mere internet access providers—
companies that serve only as conduits to the Internet—to hand over
information identifying alleged infringers.101 Similarly, the E.U.’s ECommerce Directive, which regulates the procedure by which users
are identified, does not apply to mere providers of access, but to
those that provide storage services.102 ACTA’s broad definition of
“online service provider,” to the extent it becomes part of the final
treaty, would cause its user-identification procedures to apply to
companies that serve only as access providers; ACTA neither makes
any distinction related to this obligation nor to the kind of service
provided by OSPs.103
The deleted definition of OSPs not only applied to any person and
provider, even those that provide only access, but also to any online
101. 351 F.3d 1229, 1237 (D.C. Cir. 2003). Commentators agree that the
Verizon case has been a triumph for privacy advocates, but it has not seriously
affected the copyright holders’ protections because they still can issue subpoenas,
which are available to any litigant who wants to sue an unknown defendant by
filing against John Doe. This mechanism provides more substantive and procedural
protection for Internet users, but it is not enough to avoid misuse and abuse of the
procedure. See, e.g., Alice Kao, RIAA v. Verizon: Applying the Subpoena
Provision of the DMCA, 19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 405, 421-24 (2004) (discussing
the potential for abuse in John Doe lawsuits, citing the provision’s broad language,
lack of judicial oversight, and the lack of a notice requirement); Tomas P. Owen,
Jr. & A. Benjamin Katz, RIAA v. Verizon Internet Services, Inc.: Peer-to-Peer
Networking Renders Section 512(h) Subpoenas Under the Digital Millennium
Copyright Act Obsolete, 24 LOY. L.A. ENT. L. REV. 619, 623, 632-634 (2004)
(approving of the John Doe subpoenas because they are not more expensive or
time consuming than section 512(h) requests to subpoena service providers).
102. Directive 2000/31 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 8 June
2000 on Certain Legal Aspects of Information Society Services, art. 15.2, 2000
O.J. (L. 178) 1. But see Case C-557-07, Oberster Gerichtshof (Austria) – LSGGesellschaft zur Wahrnehmung von Leistungsschutzrechte GmbH v. Tele2
Telecommunicaion GmbH, 2009 O.J. (C 113) 14 (deciding, in spite of the literal
wording of the mentioned Directive, that the obligation to identify users could be
imposed on access providers, even when they do no supply any other storage
service).
103. See ACTA Draft—July 1, 2010, supra note 17, art. 2.18, ¶ 3 n.48 (defining
an ”online service provider” as including an entity—not limited to an entity).
ACTA, however, did make that distinction in the proposed notice-and-take-down
procedure. See id. art. 2.18, ¶ 3(b); see also ACTA Draft—Jan. 18, 2010, supra
note 16, art. 2.17, ¶ 3 n.28 (excluding from the notice-and-take-down procedures
those providers acting solely as a conduit for Internet access).
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service, not only Internet-based providers. If this definition becomes
part of the finalized text, it could be cumbersome for negotiating
parties, and maybe even weaken domestic regulatory protections if
the provision regarding the identification of alleged infringers reverts
back to being mandatory rather than permissive. For example, E.U.
law limits the collection of personal data generated or processed by
“providers of publicly available electronic communications services
or of a public communications network.”104 Therefore, ACTA could
undermine this standard by imposing obligations on types of OSPs
that are not yet addressed in the current E.U. law, such as private
network services.105 By not adopting such a broad concept of OSPs
and making this provision facultative, ACTA succeeds in avoiding
conflict with some domestic laws, such as the aforementioned E.U.
law. However, lacking any concept of OSP creates legal uncertainty
to the extent that implementing this recommendation may not help in
harmonizing international enforcement, keeping in mind the
differences between the DMCA approach in U.S. law,106 domestic
laws drafted according to FTAs,107 and the E.U. directives.
The ACTA provision on identifying subscribers has a broad scope.
This provision applies not only to copyright and related rights
enforcement but also to trademark enforcement. Furthermore, at odds
with negotiators’ initial suggestions, this provision does not apply
only for piracy and counterfeiting, but also for the criminal and civil
enforcement of IP rights in general.108
104. Council Directive 2006/24, supra note 64, art. 3.2.
105. In the July 1, 2010 draft of ACTA, it was possible to appreciate a
disagreement between those countries that wanted to apply this section to “the
Internet” (Mexico, Singapore, and the United States) and those that wanted to
extend its scope to “digital environment” (the European Union and Switzerland),
which are already the words used in the provisional title of the whole section. See
ACTA Draft—July 1, 2010, supra note 17, art. 2.18.1.
106. See 17 U.S.C. § 512 (2006) (providing that a service providers are not
liable for monetary, injunctive, or equitable relief if the transmission of copyright
material was initiated by a person who is not the service provider).
107. This may be the case in Chile, which in May 2010 implemented a Free
Trade Agreement with the United States by imposing an obligation to identify
users on OSPs other than those that provide mere access. See Ley 17.336 sobre
Propiedad Intelectual, [Intellectual Property Act], Ago. 8, 1970, as amended,
DIARIO OFFICIAL, May 4, 2010 (Chile), arts. 85 L to 85 U.
108. ACTA Text—Dec. 3, 2010, supra note 9, art. 27, ¶ 4 (extending the scope
of the provisions that identify users for any infringement so long as the rights
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However, the former matter—whether the provision encouraging
the identification of subscribers would apply only to copyright and
related rights or also to other IP rights—was not settled until the last
round of negotiations.109 The title of the section referred to
enforcement of IP rights, generally, and some countries seemed to be
pushing for such a broad approach, but luckily that approach was
rejected for the final text of ACTA.110 For now, the controversy has
been solved in favor of a scope for this provision that extends only to
trademark, copyright and related rights.111 In spite of lacking
mandatory effects, this could still be problematic for the United
States, since the DMCA limits its provisions to enforce copyright
and related rights; therefore, full compliance with the recommended
standard of ACTA would require the adoption of legislative
measures.
In addition to the fact that the scope of the provision on identifying
subscribers is broad, it is important to point out that they do not
apply only to serious crime, either counterfeit or piracy, but to any
criminal behavior. Going beyond its declared purposes, ACTA
requires identifying any infringer, even when the conduct is neither
counterfeiting nor piracy.112 Although negotiating parties recognized
some gradation among criminal conduct,113 for the purpose of
holder files a legally sufficient claim for “trademark and copyrights or related
rights infringement”).
109. ACTA Draft―Oct. 2, 2010, supra note 10, art. 2.18.4.
110. Australia, Canada, Mexico, New Zealand, Singapore, and the United States
supported a scope limited to trademark, copyright and related rights, while the
European Union, Japan, and Switzerland a broader approach, which extends to all
intellectual property rights. See ACTA Draft—July 1, 2010, supra note 17, art.
2.18.1.
111. Compare ACTA Text—Dec. 3, 2010, supra note 9, art. 27, ¶ 2 (applying
only to infringement of copyright or related rights), and id. art 27, ¶ 4 (applying to
both trademark and copyright or related rights), with ACTA Draft—Oct 2, 2010,
supra note 10, arts. 2.18.2 & 2.18.4 (applying to infringement of at least trademark
and copyright or related rights).
112. See ACTA Text—Dec. 3, 2010, supra note 9, art. 23 (criminalizing not
only “willful trademark counterfeiting or copyright . . . piracy on a commercial
scale,” but also unauthorized filming of cinematographic works, and aiding and
abetting in the above crimes). But see id. art. 27 (applying the provisions on
identifying users to trademark or copyright or related rights infringements).
113. See, e.g., ACTA Draft—July 1, 2010, supra note 17, art. 2.14.1 (referring
to criminal offenses in “cases of willful trademark counterfeiting or copyright or
related rights piracy on a commercial scale”); id. art. 2.16.3 (mentioning
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identifying users, ACTA does not make any distinction and seems to
apply to any infringing activity. Given the initial purpose of the
agreement and the lack of consensus about what constitutes a
criminal offense, ACTA has had to introduce some restrictions in the
application of the provisions on identifying users—for example, by
limiting them to criminal actions concerning piracy.114
The provision about the identification of subscribers in ACTA
applies not only to criminal enforcement, but also to civil
enforcement.115 Neither the provisions that encourage granting access
to subscriber information, nor those related to the civil enforcement
section of the agreement, which also apply to enforcing the law in
the digital environment, exclude the provision on identifying Internet
users from civil enforcement. This could be troublesome, as most
countries require OSPs to retain traffic data for purposes of criminal
prosecution, especially in the cases of so-called cybercrime,116 but do
not apply such data retention to civil enforcement actions. The
underlying belief is that granting access to personal data of Internet
users processed by OSPs jeopardizes human rights and the essential
values of a democratic society, a risk that cannot be tolerated for
mere civil enforcement of IP rights that, after all, according to the
TRIPS Agreement, are private rights.
In the case of the E.U., for example, the Data Retention Directive
requires providers to process subscribers’ personal data for the
purpose of investigation, detection, and prosecution of serious
crime.117 However, according to the decision of the European Court
of Justice in the case Productores de Música de España
(Promusicae) v. Telefónica de España SAU, while Community law
does not set forth a specific obligation upon E.U. members to
“indictable offenses” and “serious offenses”); id. art. 2.17 (referring to “cases of
significant public interest”); id. art. 2.X (border measures - de minimis provision)
(permitting an exception to border measures in case of de minimis infringement,
which is not the case for granting access to personal data related to a supposed
infringer).
114. ACTA Text—Dec. 3, 2010, supra note 9, art. 5 (k) (providing a concept of
pirated copyright goods, but one that is still considerably broad and would require
some changes in order to rationalize the scope of the criminal enforcement
provisions).
115. Id. art. 27, ¶ 4.
116. See, e.g., Convention on Cybercrime, supra note 85, art. 14, ¶ 2.
117. Council Directive 2006/24, supra note 64, art. 1.
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guarantee access to Internet users’ personal data for copyright
holders in civil enforcement actions, Community law does allow the
adoption of this kind of measure in domestic law.118 In sum, full
compliance with the encouraged terms of ACTA would require E.U.
members to adopt domestic laws that oblige providers to identify
subscribers for purposes of civil enforcement, even when it is not
mandatory under Community law.
ACTA encourages the adoption of procedures granting access to
the personal information of subscribers held by OSPs in order to
facilitate IP enforcement. However, keeping in mind the initial
purposes of ACTA, this article recommends an express limitation on
the scope of such access to information, for example, by permitting
that access in criminal cases involving copyright piracy and
prohibiting that access in civil enforcement actions.

D. ACTA OMITS SPECIFIC SAFEGUARDS UNDER THE RIGHT TO
PERSONAL DATA PROTECTION TO ENCOURAGE ACCESS TO
PERSONAL INFORMATION OF INTERNET USERS.
While ACTA encourages granting access to Internet users’
personal information for purposes of IP enforcement, during most of
the negotiations, ACTA failed to include any measure to protect the
rights of those concerned about an abusive use of that access
mechanism. On the contrary, the July 1, 2010 ACTA draft seems to
privilege expeditious access to data, without mentioning either
substantive or procedural safeguards.119 The absence of consideration
for the rights to privacy and protection of personal data led to E.U.
authorities calling attention to the matter, which presumably led to
the inclusion of some flexibility in the latest version of ACTA.120
Besides the non-mandatory nature of the provision granting access
118. Case C-275/06, Productores de Música de España (Promusicae) v.
Telefónica de España SAU, 2008 E.C.R. I-00271; see Ramón Casas Vallés,
Pursuing the P2P Pirates: Balancing Copyright and Privacy Rights, WIPO
MAGAZINE (English version), Apr. 2008, at 10-11 (interpreting Promusicae as
holding that national legislatures can mandate access providers to disclose
connection and traffic data; however, the legislatures’ authority is limited by the
fundamental rights under the Community legal order).
119. ACTA Draft—July 1, 2010, supra note 17, art. 2.18, ¶ 3.
120. E.g., Data Protection Supervisor Opinions, supra note 66, ¶ 4; Letter from
WP29, supra note 68.
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to personal information of Internet users, the latest ACTA draft
seems to have included at least three flexible provisions intended to
ameliorate the noxious effects of such access: (1) the clause on
privacy and disclosure of information set forth among the initial
provisions,121 (2) the article on general obligations with respect to
enforcement included in chapter two of the agreement,122 and (3) the
sentence related to the implementation of the provision regarding the
identification of users.123 The first does not apply directly to the
mechanism for identifying Internet users, but to the disclosure of
information between ACTA parties; this provision is analyzed later
in the context of cross-border transfers of personal data.124 The
second two provisions seem directly relevant to mitigating the effects
of the provisions on identifying users.
The section on general obligations with respect to enforcement
makes several statements relevant for our purpose: “[Enforcement]
procedures shall be applied in such a manner as . . . to provide for
safeguards against their abuse.”;125 “Procedures . . . to implement the
provisions of this Chapter shall be fair and equitable, and shall
provide for the rights of all the participants subject to such
procedures”;126 and, “In implementing . . . this Chapter, each Party
shall take into account the need for proportionality between the
seriousness of the infringement, the interests of third parties, and the
applicable measures . . . . “127 This set of provisions provides an
interesting legal framework to balance IP enforcement with adequate
protection for the rights to privacy and protection of personal data.
For example, to prevent abuse, domestic law could require right
holders to provide relevant information before receiving access to
personal data of supposed infringers; protecting the rights of all the
participants could justify judicial control on request and delivery of
data; and, the application of the principle of proportionality could
imply excluding de minimis infringement from the scope of the
provisions on identifying users. Therefore, countries that accept the
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.

ACTA Text—Dec. 3, 2010, supra note 9, art. 4.
Id. art. 6.
Id. art. 27, ¶ 4.
Id. art. 22; see infra Part II.G.
Id. art. 6, ¶ 1.
Id. art. 6, ¶ 2.
Id. art. 6, ¶ 3.
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challenge of including provisions on identifying users into their
domestic law, as is encouraged by ACTA, cannot only set forth such
obligation for OSPs; those countries must adopt safeguards as well.
In addition to the general obligation on enforcement, ACTA
establishes a third set of provisions that tries to balance IP
enforcement and the rights to privacy and protection of personal data
in the section that sets forth rules on procedures for identifying users.
According to ACTA, “[t]hese procedures shall be implemented in a
manner that . . . consistent with that Party’s law, preserves
fundamental principles such as freedom of expression, fair process,
and privacy.”128 This provision makes clear that, in spite of its
absence during most of the negotiation, negotiating parties realized
that enforcing IP could conflict with other competing interests,
including the right to privacy. Therefore, ACTA admits that some
concessions should be made in favor of privacy, but it does not mean
that privacy concerns (or any other “fundamental principles”) will
block the adoption of rules on the identification of users.
These flexible ACTA provisions allow countries to adopt
measures that guarantee the protection of the right to privacy in
balance with IP enforcement, at least to some extent. By applying
criteria such as proportionality and prevention of abuse, countries
that decide to implement the provisions regarding the identification
of users, encouraged by ACTA, can mitigate the noxious effects of
those procedures that undermine the protection of privacy. However,
the language of these protective ACTA provisions is extremely
general and requires adopting concrete measures in domestic law. In
this sense, those general statements seem insufficient to protect
privacy and personal data processing in the context of IP
enforcement online. ACTA runs short of provisions setting forth
specific safeguards. For example, there are no rules regarding the
amount of time OSPs should keep subscribers’ personal data,
procedures that properly guarantee the rights of concerned
subscribers, or even which data should be kept.129 It has even been
128. Id. art. 27, ¶ 4. Similar provisions are also available in other articles of
ACTA on enforcement of intellectual property rights in the digital environment.
See id. art. 27, ¶ 2 (covering the scope of enforcement procedures in civil cases);
id. art. 27, ¶ 3 (promoting business cooperation).
129. Some of those safeguards (and useful boundaries) are typically included in
other international instruments and E.U. law. See, e.g., Convention on Cybercrime,
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noted by E.U. authorities that ACTA’s failure to specify any
temporal limitation for the processing of personal data by OSPs
could lead to a conflict with E.U. law.130
The absence of appropriate safeguards is contrary to the high
standards of protection adopted by the E.U., and even the minimal
formal requirements provided by the DMCA in the United States.131
In the E.U., according to the European Court of Justice, members
that wish to implement into domestic law a mechanism to identify
Internet users must balance fundamental rights.132 National
authorities must interpret their domestic laws in a manner consistent
with fundamental rights, and with the other general principles of
Community law, such as the principle of proportionality.133 In the
United States, even the most expeditious procedure for identifying an
alleged infringer, provided by the DMCA, has some minimal
required showings and mandates the filing of certain documents.134
Even these minimal concrete safeguards are absent in ACTA.
ACTA succeeded in including some general safeguards for the
right to privacy and protection of personal data, but, naturally, the
actual efficacy of these general safeguards will be unclear until they
supra note 85, arts. 15-16; Council Directive 2006/24, supra note 64, arts. 5-7.
130. See Data Protection Supervisor Opinions, supra note 66, ¶ 80 (specifying
that the duration of data retention shall be proportional to the recipient’s purpose
for retaining the data); see also Council Directive 2006/24, supra note 64, art. 6
(specifying that data shall be retained for no less than six months but no more than
two years).
131. See 17 U.S.C. § 512(h) (2006) (requiring a copyright owner to request that
the clerk of any U.S. District Court issue a subpoena to a service provider to
determine the identity of an alleged infringer).
132. See Productores de Música de España, 2008 E.C.R. ¶ 70 (holding that E.U.
member states are not required to mandate communication of personal data to
ensure civil copyright enforcement; however, if a member states chooses to do so,
it must ensure that interpretations of the mandate would not conflict with
fundamental rights).
133. See id.
134. 17 U.S.C. § 512(h). Copyright holders may “request the clerk of any United
States district court to issue a subpoena to [an ISP] for identification of an alleged
infringer.” Id. § 512(h)(1). This request must include a sworn declaration that the
information is sought solely for the purpose of protecting copyright. Kao, supra
note 101, at 410; see Julie E. Cohen, David E. Sorkin & Peter P. Swire, Copyright
& Privacy – Through the Privacy Lens, 4 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 273,
278 (2005) (arguing that the relevant DMCA’s provisions are excessively
permissive and seriously threaten privacy).
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are applied. Regardless, the absence of specific safeguards in the
agreement not only jeopardizes the protection of the right to privacy,
but fails to advance legal harmonization among ACTA members.
This could become a serious problem, particularly for those countries
lacking adequate technical assistance and/or suffering from political
pressure to turn over information about alleged infringers.

E. ACTA PROVIDES LEGAL SUPPORT FOR IMPLEMENTING THE
POLEMICAL THREE STRIKES POLICY BY REQUIRING THE
PROMOTION OF COOPERATIVE EFFORTS WITHIN THE BUSINESS
COMMUNITY
The three strikes policy, also known as “graduated response,” is a
domestic legal mechanism allowing the disconnection of a supposed
infringing Internet user for a given period of time, after the user has
received warnings about, and failed to cease copyright infringement
occurring via his Internet account.135 At this time, only a handful of
countries have passed laws adopting three strikes provisions,
including France,136 South Korea,137 Taiwan,138 the United
Kingdom,139 and New Zealand.140
135. Three Strikes/Graduated Response, CTR. FOR DEMOCRACY & TECH.,
http://www.cdt.org/issue/3-strikes-graduated-response (last visited Mar. 1, 2011).
136. Loi 2009-669 du 12 juin 2009 favorisant la diffusion et la protection de la
creation sur internet [Law 2009-669 of 12 June 2009 on promoting the distribution
and protection of creative works on the internet], JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE LA
RÉPUBLIQUE FRANÇAISE [J.O.] [OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF FRANCE], June 13, 2009, p.
9666.
137. See Ju-jak-kwon-bup [Copyright Law], Act No. 3916, Dec. 30, 1989,
amended by Act No. No. 9625, April 22, 2009, arts. 133-2 to 133-3 (S. Kor.),
available at http://www.wipo.int/wipolex/en/text.jsp?file_id=190145 (authorizing
the Minister of Culture, Sports, and Tourism to order ISPs to suspend for up to six
months the accounts of those users who have been warned three times for
transmitted illegal reproductions).
138. Copyright Act art. 90 quinquies (Taiwan) (modified May 2009), available
at http://www.wipo.int/wipolex/en/text.jsp?file_id=187795 (providing that the
service provider shall terminate the subscriber’s service after three repeated
infringements).
139. See Digital Economy Act, 2010, c. 24 § 9, 124G (U.K.) (describing that the
service provider shall limit the speed or material available to the subscriber or
simply suspend his service entirely).
140. The Copyright (New Technologies) Amendment Act, adopted in April
2008, modified the copyright law by adopting a three strikes provision, which was
later modified by the Copyright (Infringing File Sharing) Amendment Bill, 2010.
See Copyright (New Technologies Amendment Act 2008, First Schedule, cl 92A
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The French three strikes law was introduced by President Nicolas
Sarkozy’s government, and probably best illustrates how polemical
this policy can be.141 The bill generated serious concerns for the
French data protection authority over the protection of Internet users’
personal data.142 Once adopted by the legislature, the law was
declared unconstitutional by the Constitutional Council because it
infringed on the right to due process of law by allowing an
administrative authority to impose sanctions,143 by-passing the
presumption of innocence by requiring the subscriber to prove he has
not committed an infringement.144 It also infringes on the right of free
speech because “[i]n the current state of [affairs] . . . the participation
in democracy and the expression of ideas and opinions [includes the]
freedom to access [to those Internet] services.”145 Eventually, the
unconstitutionality was remedied by the French Parliament, which
empowered courts to disconnect Internet users.146 Only after one year
in force did the French authority start issuing warnings of
infringement,147 and to-date no one has been disconnected.148 As

(N.Z.).
141. E.g., French Reject Internet Privacy Law, B.B.C. NEWS (Apr. 9, 2009),
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/7992262.stm.
142. La Loi Antipiratage: le Gouvernement Critiqué par la CNIL, LA TRIBUNE
(Fr.), Nov. 3, 2008.
143. Conseil Constitutionnel [CC] [Constitutional Council], decision no. 2009580DC, June 10, 2009, ¶¶ 16, 39 (Fr.).
144. Id. ¶ 17. Interestingly, this is a common feature of all the three strikes laws
already adopted: the user is presumed guilty in advance and, therefore, must prove
his/her innocence notwithstanding any technical limitations. For example, the
British Digital Economy Act set forth disconnection of users, euphemistically
called technical measures, which may be adopted by Internet service providers;
users can appeal the measure, but the onus probandi is on the user’s shoulders. See
Digital Economy Act § 124K. Thus, users are presumed guilty.
145. Id. ¶ 12.
146. Loi 498 du 24 juin 2009 relatif à la protection pénale de la propriété
littéraire et artistique sur internet [Law 498 of June 24, 2009 relating to the
criminal protection of literary and artistic property on the Internet] JOURNAL
OFFICIEL DE LA REPUBLIQUE FRANÇAISE [J.O.] [OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF FRANCE],
Oct. 29, 2009, p. 18290.
147. See First warning letters sent by French ISPs under the Three Strikes
System, EUR. DIGITAL RTS. (Oct. 6, 2010), http://www.edri.org/edrigram/
number8.19/first-email-three-strikes-france.
148. See Francia inicia la segunda fase de avisos a los internautas que
descargan sin permiso, EL MUNDO (Spain) (Jan. 12, 2011), http://www.el
mundo.es/elmundo/2011/01/12/navegante/1294839153.html. (reporting that the
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Jérémie Zimmermann, the spokesperson of La Quadrature du Net, a
French advocacy group that promotes rights and freedoms on the
Internet, said it seems that the law has created a “big tax-sponsored
spam machine.”149
The French three strikes law also had an effect at the Community
level. Sarkozy’s initiative created a conflict between the European
Commission, then under the presidency of the French government,
and the European Parliament in the context of the adoption of the
Telecom Package.150 The conflict eventually was solved by adopting
an amendment, resisted by Sarkozy’s government, which requires
that “[m]easures taken by Member States regarding end-users’
access . . . shall respect the fundamental rights and freedoms of
natural persons, as guaranteed by the European Convention for the
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms and general
principles of Community law.”151
Returning to the subject of ACTA, the first leaked versions
included an explicit mention of the three strikes law in their
footnotes, presented an example of a policy addressing the
unauthorized storage or transmission of materials protected by
copyright or related rights.152 The content of that footnote was
deleted in the official release of ACTA,153 but ACTA retained the
provisions that formed the basis for the three strikes policy, requiring
HADOPI is just working on a second round of warnings).
149. Hadopi is dead: "three strikes" buried by highest court, LA QUADRATURE
(Fr.) (Jun. 10, 2009), http://www.laquadrature.net/fr/hadopi-is-dead-three-strikeskilled-by-highest-court.
150. See Leigh Phillips, France Passes ‘Three Strikes’ Piracy Law,
BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (May 14, 2009, 1:43 PM), http://www.business
week.com/globalbiz/content/may2009/gb20090514_391445.htm (noting that the
French legislation was passed despite a European Parliament ruling that
governments could not disconnect internet access without first receiving a court
order).
151. Council Directive 2009/140, art. 1 (1) (b), 2009 O.J. (L 337) 37 (EC).
152. See ACTA Draft—Jan. 18, 2010, supra note 16, art. 2.17.3 n.29 (“[A]n
example of such a policy is providing for the termination in appropriate
circumstances of subscriptions and/or accounts on the service provider’s system or
network of repeat infringers.”); see also EUROPEAN UNION DIRECTORATEGENERAL FOR TRADE, ACTA NEGOTIATIONS Ref. 588/09, (Sept. 30, 2009).
153. ACTA Draft—Apr. 21, 2010, supra note 14, n.58 (noting, instead, that at
least one delegation proposed to include language in that footnote to provide
greater certainty that their existing national law complies with the proposed article
of ACTA).
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that an OSP satisfy certain requirements to enjoy limited liability for
online infringements.154
In addition to human rights concerns, disconnecting Internet users,
as previous drafts of ACTA suggested, could be especially
cumbersome for countries that already have recognized the rights to
Internet access and/or to broadband.155 But it is not just the sanction
of the disconnection itself that causes concern, but also the lack of
substantive and procedural safeguards for supposed infringers.156 For
example, previous drafts of ACTA did not impose a general
monitoring requirement on OSPs,157 but the implementation of a
three strikes provision would necessarily require some processing of
personal data without authorization from the user. Again, ACTA
drafts failed to provide a minimum legal framework for such data
processing.
The European authorities on data protection analyzed the ACTA
provisions on three strikes and their negative effects on the right to
privacy. According to the Supervisor and the WP29, the text of
ACTA at the very least encouraged the implementation of the
controversial three strikes policy.158 They argued that the agreement
should include some “minimum standards for the enforcement,” and
called to attention that large scale monitoring or systematic recording
of data would be contrary to E.U. law.159
Presumably because of the criticism against the three strikes
provision included in the drafts of ACTA and the disagreement
among negotiating parties around the limitation of liability for OSPs
in cases of online infringements, the last version of ACTA does not
include either of them.160 However, it does not mean that the three
154. Id. art. 2.18.3.
155. See, e.g., Communications Market Act, amended in September 2009, §60 d
(331/2009) (Fin.) (recognizing the access to broadband service as a legal right
through a universal service obligation); Corte Suprema de Justicia [C.S.J.]
[Supreme Court], Sala. Const. Julio 30, 2010, decision no. 2010012790, ¶ IV
(Costa Rica) (recognizing an autonomous right to access to the Internet through the
interfaces chosen by consumers and users).
156. See supra Part II.D.
157. ACTA Draft—July 1, 2010, supra note 17, art. 2.18.3.
158. See Data Protection Supervisor Opinions, supra note 66, ¶ 15; Letter from
WP29, supra note 68.
159. Letter from WP29, supra note 68.
160. ACTA Text—Dec. 3, 2010, supra note 9, art. 27.
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strikes policy has been successfully counteracted in ACTA; in fact, it
still survives under the requirement to promote cooperative efforts
within the business community.161 Such cooperative efforts could
reasonably take the form of a privately implemented three strikes
regime, because OSPs may feel forced to implement disconnection
of users to avoid litigation with right holders, particularly in those
countries that lack adequate protection for Internet users.
During the negotiations of ACTA, one article required parties to
promote the development of mutually supportive relationships
between OSPs and rights holders to deal with IP infringement online,
and encouraged the establishment of guidelines.162 In the last text of
ACTA, that article has become broader in scope, by imposing on
parties the obligation to promote cooperative efforts within the
business community to effectively address infringement—
obligations that apply to trademark, copyright, and related rights
infringements.163 On this point, it is important to note here that the
self-regulatory approach has been used in some countries, such as the
United Kingdom164 and Ireland,165 to promote the adoption of three
strikes policies by the OSPs. Under the pressure from copyright
holders and with the implicit agreement of governments, OSPs have
modified their contracts with subscribers to include clauses that
legitimize the disconnection of users for supposed copyright
infringements.166 This raises the issue of limiting the waiver of
fundamental rights through contractual clauses, which is beyond the
purpose of this article.
161. Id. art. 27, ¶ 3.
162. ACTA Draft—July 1, 2010, supra note 17, art. 2.18.3 quater.
163. ACTA Text—Dec. 3, 2010, supra note 9, art. 27, ¶ 3.
164. See Christian L. Castle & Amy E. Mitchell, What’s Wrong With ISP Music
Licensing?, 26 ENT. & SPORTS L. 4, 6 (2008) (referencing a July 24, 2008
“Memorandum of Understanding” signed between the principal U.K. record label
trade association and the U.K.’s six largest service providers); see also Eleanor
Dallaway, Music Piracy Born Out of a ‘Something for Nothing’ Society,
INFOSECURITY, Apr. 2008, at 16, 17-20.
165. See KARLIN LILLINGTON, Putting Up Barriers to a Free and Open Internet,
IRISH TIMES, Apr. 16, 2010, http://www.irishtimes.com/newspaper/finance/2010/
0416/1224268442542.html (noting that self-regulation began in the area of child
pornography, but has since expanded to the problem of cybercrime, and reporting
the interest of the Irish government to implement a three strikes policy).
166. Cf. id. (recounting discussions between the government and OSPs on also
introducing internet filtering technology for their subscribers).
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Promoting cooperation and self-regulation seems adequate to deal
with the continuous changes and challenges of the technological
environment, and without the usual delay of legal solutions.
However, it should not become the source of practices that
undermine the rights of third parties, particularly the Internet endusers. Fortunately, the final text of ACTA takes advantage of
previous experiences and includes two sets of safeguards, albeit
minimal ones, against possible excesses of the so-called cooperative
efforts. The first set is the previously mentioned article on general
obligations with respect to enforcement, according to which the
implementation of procedures shall avoid their abuse, protect the
rights of all the participants, and take into account the need for
proportionality.167 The second set of safeguards appears immediately
after the obligation on cooperative efforts. According to ACTA,
parties shall promote that cooperation “while . . . consistent with
each Party’s law, preserving fundamental principles such as freedom
of expression, fair process, and privacy.”168 These safeguards,
appropriately included in the last version of ACTA, should help in
mitigating the use of the obligation to promote cooperative efforts
within the business community as a pretext to introduce a three
strikes policy, and undermine the rights to privacy and protection of
personal data.
However, given the excesses of contractual measures tolerated in
some legal regimes, safeguards adopted under ACTA could become
insufficient in some cases. For that reason, and given the intrinsic
punitive nature of the three strikes policy—actual modern day
ostracism, ACTA mentions that freedom of expression, fair process,
and privacy could be not enough. In other words, ACTA has had to
defer to the basic principles of criminal and human rights laws, such
as nullum poena sine legem (principle of legality), non bis in idem
(prohibition of double incrimination), the presumption of innocence,
and the due process of law.
In sum, the final version of ACTA does not include explicit
references to either the three strikes policy or the requirement for an
167. See ACTA Text—Dec. 3, 2010, supra note 9, art. 6 (requiring states parties
to consider the seriousness of any infringement against the interests of third parties
in addition to applicable measures, remedies, and penalties).
168. Id. art. 27, ¶ 3.

636

AM. U. INT’L L. REV.

[26:3

OSP to qualify for the limitation of liability of IP infringements
online; however, ACTA requires that parties promote cooperative
efforts within the business community, which could lead to the
implementation of a three strikes policy. For this case, ACTA has
adopted some reasonable safeguards in order to balance IP
enforcement with the rights to privacy and protection of personal
data. However, those safeguards may not be enough and, given the
punitive nature of the three strikes policy, ACTA has had to include
stronger preventions.

F. ACTA EMPHASIZES THE PROTECTION OF EFFECTIVE
TECHNOLOGICAL MEASURES, BUT DOES NOT AFFORD
PROTECTION FOR THE PRIVACY AND PERSONAL DATA OF USERS
AFFECTED BY SUCH MEASURES
The ACTA negotiators have provided a significant boost in the
legal protection of effective technological measures, beyond the
standard adopted in the WIPO Internet Treaties.169 Before the official
public release of ACTA, it required not only adequate legal
protection and effective legal remedies, but also civil remedies or
criminal penalties,170 independent of any infringement of copyright
or related rights.171 Both mentioned requirements were excesses that
do not appear in the last version of ACTA.172 But, similar to the
DMCA, ACTA still requires adopting anti-circumventing and antitrafficking provisions, the latter of which implies serious difficulties
in making real the possible safeguards that a country “may” adopt in
favor of the users whose rights are protected through certain
exceptions and limitations to copyright and related rights.173
Unfortunately, unlike the DMCA and the FTAs signed by the United
States with several countries, ACTA does not provide even a
minimum list of those exceptions.
Analyzing the provisions about the legal protection of the effective
169. See World Intellectual Property Organization Copyright Treaty, supra note
33, art. 11 (obligating contracting parties to provide “adequate” and “effective”
legal remedies against copyright infringers); World Intellectual Property
Organization Performances and Phonograms Treaty, supra note 33, art. 18.
170. ACTA Draft—Jan. 18, 2010, supra note 16, art. 2.18.4.
171. ACTA Draft—July 1, 2010, supra note 17, art. 2.18.5.
172. ACTA Text—Dec. 3, 2010, supra note 9, art. 27, ¶ 5.
173. Id. art. 27, ¶ 6.
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technological measures is beyond the purpose of this paper.
However, besides the copyright limitations and exceptions allowed
by ACTA, it fails to include any specific limitation that guarantees
the adequate protection of the rights to privacy and the protection of
personal data. It is still possible to apply the safeguards adopted in
the general obligations to enforcement, particularly the one that
requires parties to take into account the need for proportionality,174
but it is not clear to which extent these safeguards will be enough to
counteract the risk to the rights to privacy and protection of personal
data. On the other hand, it is clear that including a provision that
provides safeguards for those rights is necessary insofar as
technological measures process personal data of people who use or
access protected works.

G. ACTA OMITS PROVISIONS TO SAFEGUARD PROPERLY THE
PROTECTION OF PERSONAL DATA IN CROSS-BORDER TRANSFERS
OF SUCH DATA
Complying with or enforcing IP rules requires, to some extent,
exchanging personal information between parties, such as data about
copyright holders and supposed infringers. This is especially true in
the case of online infringements; overcoming the limitations of
territorially-based domestic laws demands a global answer, which
calls for international cooperation in the enforcement of the law. In
the case of ACTA, countries that adhere to the agreement shall share
relevant information and shall adopt some enforcement practices that
require processing information, including, potentially, personal
data.175 Therefore, ACTA requires cross-border transfers of personal
data176 and, as a result, ACTA has had to deal with provisions
safeguarding some level of protection for the personal information
that is transferred from one country to another.177
Several countries already have personal data protection laws,
which balance the protection of people’s privacy with the free flow
of information. However, as it was understood early on by the
174. See id. art. 6, ¶ 3.
175. Id. art. 34.
176. Id. art. 29, ¶ 1(b) (permitting parties to share information, acquired through
border enforcement, with other parties).
177. Id. art. 33, ¶ 3 (cautioning that the implementation of international
cooperation must be consistent with relevant international agreements).
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European countries, the very purpose of having strong domestic
protection could be eroded if personal data is transferred to countries
with lesser (or no) protection; cross-border transfers of personal data
to places where there is not an adequate level of protection
circumvents the objective of data privacy laws.178 Therefore, for
those countries it is necessary to adopt some limitations to those
international transfers of data.
It is not by chance that the Supervisor raised concerns over the
lack of provisions on cross-border transfers of personal data in the
previous drafts of ACTA. There have been some attempts to regulate
those transfers in international fora through legal harmonization, but
their success, if there was any, has been limited.179 But, this has not
been the case for the E.U. Since the early 1980s, the E.U. has built an
increasing level of protection for personal data in its internal market
through the adoption of specific normative measures on the matter.180
Basically, this legal framework assumes an “equivalent” level of
protection among the E.U. members, which cannot block transfers in
the internal market,181 and requires an “adequate” level of protection
in third countries before data can be transferred to them.182 Therefore,
apart from some limited exceptions,183 transferring personal data to
third countries that do not provide adequate levels of protection,
which is the case for all the countries involved in the ACTA
negotiations,184 is banned.
178. See Data Protection Supervisor Opinions, supra note 66, ¶ 76 (warning
that if transfer of personal data to third parties is necessary, specific data protection
guarantees should accompany the transfer to ensure proper data protection in the
third country).
179. See supra note 75-78 and accompanying text.
180. See e.g., Convention for the Protection of Individuals with regard to
Automatic Processing of Personal Data, Jan. 28, 1981, E.T.S. No. 108 (attempting
for first time the harmonization of personal data protection law among countries of
the European community); see also supra notes 60, 63-64.
181. Council Directive 95/46, supra note 60, ¶¶ 8-9.
182. Id. ¶¶ 56-57, 59-60; id. art. 25.
183. Id. art. 26 (banning the transfer or a set of transfers of personal data to a
third country which does not ensure an adequate level of protection except in the
indicated cases).
184. Commission Decisions on the Adequacy of the Protection of Personal Data
in Third Countries, EUR. COMMISSION, http://ec.europa.eu/justice/policies/privacy/
thridcountries/index_en.htm (last visited Mar. 1, 2011) (listing countries that
provide adequate level of protection, according to E.U. authorities: Andorra,
Argentina, Faeroe Islands, Guernsey, Isla de Man, Israel, Jersey, and Switzerland,
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ACTA negotiators, for most of the negotiations, avoided
acknowledging the fact that a satisfactory solution for transfers of
personal data is required for IP enforcement in the agreement. This is
hardly a small point, especially for the European authorities that are
more concerned with the protection of European citizens, and
particularly their right to privacy. In fact, two of the main political
conflicts between the main European authorities—the Commission
that negotiated ACTA and the Parliament that has to approve
negotiations—have been the result of the more sympathetic
engagement of the latter as opposed to the former in protecting the
right to privacy. First, the European Parliament rejected the
agreement between the European Commission and the United States
to transfer the personal data of air passengers, an issue that was
eventually resolved through the European Court of Justice.185
Second, the Parliament adopted a provision against the three strikes
policy in the Telecom Package against the Commission’s desires.186
These facts show that privacy is a serious issue for European
authorities, which ACTA negotiators did not weigh properly.
Presumably because of E.U. concerns, during the last rounds of
negotiations, ACTA included some provisions dealing with the
disclosure of information from one party to another. According to an
initial provision, nothing in ACTA “shall require any Party to
disclose: (a) information the disclosure of which would be contrary
to its law or its international agreements, including laws protecting
right of privacy, [or] (b) confidential information, the disclosure of
which would impede law enforcement or otherwise be contrary to the
public interest.”187 In other words, ACTA allows parties to preserve
limitations on the disclosure of information to other countries already
available in their domestic laws or international agreements. This
should help in preventing conflict between ACTA obligations to
provide data from one country to another and national laws that ban
but noting that there has been some authorized transfer of data in limited cases to
other countries, such as Canada and the United States).
185. See Cases C-318/04 & C-317/04, Parliament v. Comm’n, 2004 E.C.R. I4721, ¶¶ 67-70.
186. See Council Directive 2009/140, supra note 151, art. 1(1)(b)(3a).
187. ACTA Text—Dec. 3, 2010, supra note 9, art. 4, ¶¶ 1(a)-(b). There is a third
clause in this article, which also sets forth an exception to the disclosure of
information, but it deals with confidential information of particular enterprises, not
personal data. Id. art. 4, ¶ 1(c).
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cross-border transfers of personal data to third countries lacking a
given level of protection.
In addition, ACTA sets forth a limitation of the use of transferred
data by a receiving party. According to a clause introduced just in the
penultimate round of negotiation, a party that has received
information “shall . . . refrain from disclosing or using the
information for a purpose other than that for which the information
was provided, except with the prior consent of the Party providing
the information.”188 This clause intends to neutralize the risk of a
country using ACTA provisions as a mere pretense to access data
from another country.
Unfortunately both aforementioned provisions are insufficient to
guarantee an adequate level of protection for personal data otherwise
required in some countries.189 Unlike E.U. law, the ACTA provision
on disclosure curiously refers only to disclosing information, but
does not seem to apply to transfers and, more broadly, to processing
personal data as a whole. Also, the second provision, which requires
a receiving party to refrain from using the data for other purposes,
sets forth some limitations on its scope. First, it applies only when a
party has provided “written” information; and, second, the receiving
party shall refrain from disclosing or using the date, but “subject to
its domestic law and practice.”190 These two conditions significantly
undermine the protection of personal information in a potential
receiving country.
However, the main problem in regulating the cross-border
transfers of data in ACTA is that it limits its concern to the parties’
disclosure and use of the information. ACTA provisions on sharing
and disclosing information need a broader approach to cross-border
transfers of data. ACTA has had to provide an adequate level of
protection by adopting substantive provisions related to the
applicable rules and the means for ensuring their effective
application. However, an adequate level of protection requires the
existence of provisions that guarantee rights to data subjects, impose
obligations on data controllers, set principles applicable to data
processing, allocate responsibility in case of violations, and provide
188. Id. art. 4, ¶ 2.
189. See supra notes 184-85.
190. ACTA Text—Dec. 3, 2010, supra note 9, art. 4, ¶ 2.
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real enforcement. Therefore, especially under E.U. law, ACTA fails
in providing enough protection to permit transfers of personal data
among the negotiating parties.

CONCLUSIONS AND REMARKS
Authorizing any intrusion into the privacy and personal data
protection of Internet users under the guise of IP enforcement is
disproportionate, and allows an excessive misuse and abuse of
disclosed information. This jeopardizes the right to privacy—an
essential requirement for a democratic society. But, at the same time,
denying access to information that is required to identify an
infringer, particularly the perpetrator of serious infringement, is
likewise excessive. After the public disclosure of ACTA
negotiations, negotiators tried to balance the competing interests in
this dilemma: the rights to privacy and the protection of personal
data with IP enforcement.
ACTA has grown to exceed the stated purpose of the treaty—
fighting counterfeiting and piracy—and instead includes provisions
intended to enforce the law against citizens, which are serious and
unprecedented concessions.191 In spite of the later inclusion of some
safeguards, ACTA still omits appropriate substantive and procedural
safeguards for the right to privacy of Internet users. Instead of
limiting the access to personal data for serious crimes, ACTA
encourages granting access to personal information beyond domestic
laws in force. Even other international instruments that have been
seriously criticized for being intrusive on privacy, such as the
Convention on Cybercrime, seem more protective on the matter.192
In addition, ACTA provides legal support for implementing the
polemical three strikes policy, a measure that raises several concerns
from a human rights perspective, by promoting cooperation between
right holders and OSPs. The same can be said about the provisions
related to the protection of effective technological measures, which
do not afford any protection for the privacy and personal data of
users affected by them.
An additional problem arises in the harmonization between ACTA
191. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
192. See supra note 116.

642

AM. U. INT’L L. REV.

[26:3

provisions allowing transfers of personal information among the
parties and E.U. requirements for cross-border transfers of personal
data. Currently, none of the negotiating parties satisfy the E.U.’s
“adequate” level of protection to allow transfers of personal data;193
therefore, national and communitarian authorities on data protection
in the E.U. could block any transfer of such data for IP enforcement.
Later negotiations of ACTA tried to handle this issue by including
some safeguards on disclosing and using data transferred from one
country to another; however, those provisions are not enough and
their insufficiency to deal with cross-border transfers of personal
data could become a serious obstacle in the adoption of ACTA by the
European Parliament.194
ACTA fails not only in providing adequate protection for the
rights to privacy and the protection of personal data, but also in
addressing its very purpose—to provide an international framework
for harmonizing the fight against counterfeiting and piracy. For
example, ACTA attempts to deal with any use of a copyrighted work
in the digital environment, without providing
a common
understanding on essential issues for Internet regulation, such as
limitations or the exceptions to IP rights and the exhaustion of those
rights.195 In fact, because of the lack of consensus, negotiators gave
up on the most relevant provision to dealing with online IP
infringements—the one related to the limitation of liability for
OSPs.196
IP rights are essentially private rights and should rarely override
the rights to privacy and personal data protection, which have an
intrinsic social value, particularly in democratic societies.
Unfortunately, ACTA makes mistakes when it exceeds its own
193. See supra notes 182-185 and accompanying text.
194. See supra notes 185-186 and accompanying text.
195. ACTA enforces intellectual property on digital environments. However, it
does not advance the harmonization of copyright exceptions and limitations; for
example, it does not clarify the status of transitory copies, which are essential for
the very functioning of the Internet and are still illegal under some domestic laws.
ACTA also omits a common understanding about exhaustion of rights because
providing works online from one country to another may infringe the domestic law
of those countries that award exclusive import rights to right holders and,
therefore, require authorization to made available the work in different countries at
once.
196. See supra note 37.
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purpose by unnecessarily diminishing the right to privacy and the
right to protection of personal data. It ultimately promotes IP
enforcement not against smugglers and pirates, but against ordinary
citizens.

